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The effect of Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) and response distortion on 
personality and selection measures has been debated for decades (Edwards, 1957b; 
Messick & Jackson, 1961; Morgeson et al., 2007, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). 
 One area of this broad topic that has received less attention over the years has been the 
effectiveness of the scales used to measure SDR when evidence of potential response 
distortion is present.  Using a MANOVA, this study found significant differences 
between job candidate and incumbent responses on the scales of the 16PF (Cattell & 
Cattell, 1995), which can be indicative of SDR (Rosse et al., 1998). However, no 
difference between the groups was found on the Impression Management scale used to 







Personality tests and inventories have been a mainstay in industrial and 
organizational psychology for many years.  One of the consistent criticisms of self-report 
personality measures used in selection and assessment processes is that the measures are 
designed in such a way that they can be easily faked, manipulated, or distorted.  In fact, 
questions arose about potential problems with social desirability and faking on 
personality measures even before many of today’s most popular measures were created 
(Edwards, 1957b; Messick & Jackson, 1961), and the debate rages on in the Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology research today. 
As their use has continued to increase in the last decade (Birkeland, Manson, 
Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006), questions about the extent to which the responses 
to the items on personality measures can be distorted have become more and more 
prevalent in the literature (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy & 
Schmitt, 2007a).  The debate even spills into what the phenomenon should be called.  
Some use the terms “faking,” “response distortion,” “impression management,” and 
“dissimulation” interchangeably, while others claim stark differences between the words.  
For the purposes of this research, the definitions used by Paulhus (2002) will be 
employed.  Paulhus defines response biases as “any systematic tendency to answer 
questionnaire items on some basis that interferes with accurate self-reports (p.49),” and 
response sets as “short-lived biases attributable to some temporary distraction or 
motivation (p.49).”  This research focuses on response bias, and more specifically, on 
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socially desirable responding, which is a type of response bias defined by Paulhus as “the 
tendency to give overly positive self-descriptions (p.50).”  For consistency’s sake, the 
term response distortion will be used to delineate socially desirable responding, and 
“faking” as a concept.   
The larger questions surrounding response distortion on personality measures 
often fall into one of four areas: 1) Whether people distort their responses to personality 
measures depending on their reason for taking the measure (e.g., applicant versus 
incumbent), 2) Why people may distort their responses on self-report personality 
measures, 3) Whether self-report measures are able to control for or detect response 
distortion and socially desirable responding using impression management or social 
desirability scales , and 4) Whether response distortion affects the validity of personality 
measures.   
The research is perhaps the most numerous and contentious in response to the 
fourth question, the effect of response distortion and socially desirable responding (SDR) 
on the validity of personality measures.  Though that is an interesting and rich area, it is 
only tangentially related to the purpose of this study. Therefore, this will only be visited 
briefly, and solely for the purpose of informing certain areas of the research objectives of 
this study.   This study will focus on the first three questions related to response 
distortion. 
Can people distort their responses on personality measures? 
Issues with response distortion on personality measures have been argued for 
decades (Edwards, 1957a, 1957b; Guion & Gottier, 1965; Krug, 1978; Morgeson et al., 
2007a).  In looking back at some of the literature from personality’s first heyday in the 
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1940s and 1950s, we can see a reflection of the same arguments circulating in the 
research today.  Messick and Jackson (Jackson, 1960; Messick & Jackson, 1961) made an 
early distinction between acquiescence, or the tendency to agree with statements, and 
social desirability.  They looked at the effect of acquiescence on the California 
Personality Inventory (CPI; Jackson, 1960) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI: Messick & Jackson, 1961).  Using a factor analysis, they suggested 
that at the extreme, the two major factors found for the MMPI could be rotated into 
positions that could be interpreted as two response styles: the acquiescence and social 
desirability (Messick & Jackson, 1961, p. 302).  This discovery led them to suggest 
further research into the development of a “refined interpretation of these and other 
stylistic consistencies (p. 303).” Their information on acquiescence was used in part to 
create early “bias” scales, measuring the tendency to blindly agree with items.   
Additionally, Edwards (1957b) actually alluded to one of today’s most visible 
problems with self-report personality measures in a book he wrote in the late 1950s: 
The potentially distorting influence of this tendency on scores based on 
subjects’ responses to statements in personality inventories has long 
been recognized by many psychologists.  Yet, as late as 1946, Meehl 
and Hathaway (1946) could stress that, despite good reasons for 
believing in the existence of the tendency, very few systematic efforts 
had been directed toward doing anything about it. (p. vii) 
This early research on response distortion looked at the problem of social desirability in 
self-report personality measures, which has been at the epicenter of the response 
distortion argument since its inception.  The idea that people will tend to skew their 
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answers in a socially desirable direction so that they appear in a better light was 
recognized almost immediately.  Early research found a product-moment correlation of 
.87 between the probability a certain item would be endorsed and the pre-determined 
social desirability scale value for that item when people had to sign their names on their 
answer sheet, thus removing anonymity (Edwards, 1957a).  The study was replicated, 
with the measures taken anonymously the second time, and the correlation was still .83, 
suggesting that anonymity wasn’t a factor in peoples’ tendency to answer personality 
measure items in a socially desirable fashion. 
Early findings by Edwards (1957a, 1957b), Meehl & Hathaway (1946), and 
Messick & Jackson (1961) may have led to a “revamping” of items on personality 
measures, and also played a part in the inclusion of social desirability scales, 
acquiescence scales, and more broad, simple “lie” scales in many of the tests. These 
scales were designed to alert test administrators to situations in which a test-taker may be 
endorsing items based on their social desirability, or what he/she felt the response 
“should” be given social and cultural norms, rather than endorsing items in a fashion that 
accurately reflected his/her personality.  Most of the personality measures used today 
include at least one scale that looks at response distortion or social desirability that is 
taken into account during the interpretation of the test results (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 
1970). 
After nearly 40 years of back-and-forth, today’s research on response distortion 
rarely suggests outright that people are entirely unable to fake or distort their responses 
on personality measures (Birkeland et al, 2006; Hough et al, 1990; Morgeson et al, 
2007a).  In the last ten or so years, the most basic debate in the response distortion 
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argument has shifted  ever so slightly from questioning whether or not response distortion 
is possible to determining whether or not people actually do fake their responses (Hogan, 
Barrett, & Hogan, 2007; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996).  This slight shift has not 
contributed greatly toward any resolution regarding whether or not response distortion a) 
occurs or b) has any effect on personality measures within the normal population. 
There are those that believe all high-stakes or high-stress assessments will involve 
some level of participant deception (Morgeson et al, 2007a), and even the strongest 
proponents of self-report measures will concede that some people are capable of 
distorting their responses to a self-report in order to appear in a more positive light, 
especially when a job may be on the line (Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran, & Deller, 2006; 
Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007; Tett & Christiansen, 2007).  In fact, those on both sides 
of the argument appear to support the evidence that people with certain attitudes and 
personality characteristics may be more prone to response distortion (Morgeson et al., 
2007a; Rossé, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).  Others lend credence to the idea that 
there may be a more defined model of response distortion based on a participant’s ability 
to fake, with some engaging in self-deception, and others in impression management.  
Those engaged in self-deception are ignorant of their distortion, believing they are 
answering truthfully when, in fact, they are not.  Those engaging in impression 
management are deliberately answering particular items in a way that they believe will 
cause them to appear attractive to an employer, and may or not be conscious of doing so 
(Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Paulhus, 1984). 
Those supporting the notion that response distortion can and does occur on 
personality measures have conducted research that examines selection and assessment 
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situations where one group may have more motivation to fake than a second comparison 
group.  One of the most commonly used approaches to measure response distortion has 
been to compare the scores of those completing a personality measure as job applicants 
against those taking the measure in a situation that will not have an effect on whether or 
not they obtain or keep a job (i.e. incumbents).  Several studies have shown a significant 
difference between applicant and non-applicant scores on personality measures, 
suggesting applicants may be more apt to skew their answers in a socially desirable 
direction (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Hough, Eaton, 
Dunnette, & Kamp, 1990; Morgeson et al, 2007a, Rosse et al., 1998).  It is thought that 
this may occur because applicants have more at stake than incumbents (Robie, Zickar, & 
Schmit, 2001; Rossé et al., 1998), as applicants are hoping to be able to get a job, while 
incumbents may not feel as great a need to impress those administering the measure. 
Rossé, Stecher, Miller, & Levin (1998) contend that individuals are not only 
capable of faking on personality measures, but will fake their responses in a selection 
context.  The authors found significantly greater levels of response distortion in job 
applicants versus job incumbent groups, and further argued that response distortion in job 
applicants has an impact on who is hired.  There has been some support for this theory 
(Morgeson et al., 2007), but others have conducted research that shows response 
distortion has no adverse impact on selection (Bradley &  Hauenstein, 2006; Ones et al., 
2007; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). 
Why do people distort their responses on self-report personality measures? 
The theories that explain why people can or do fake or distort their responses 
personality measures are more complicated than the relatively simple explanation for 
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why differences between applicants and incumbents emerge on tests.  While the fact that 
applicant test-takers have more at stake in a selection situation than incumbents when 
completing a measure as a part of an assessment or basic experiment is easy to 
understand, the cognitive processes behind score differences are considerably more 
complex. 
Paulhus (1984) outlined an early two-factor model of socially desirable 
responding.  In this model, Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) occurred for one of two 
reasons: as part of “Self-Deception” or as part of “Impression Management.”  Any 
unrealistically positive pattern about which the test-taker appeared to be wholly 
convinced was considered to be self-deception, which was regarded as an unconscious 
process.  To describe the second factor in SDR, Paulhus arrived at the term “Impression 
Management” after revamping Sackeim and Gur’s (1978) concept of “other-deception.”  
Like many, Paulhus noted that continually feeling obliged to present a positive image of 
oneself could be regarded as a part of personality, rather than strictly as deception, which 
insinuates an intention to falsely represent oneself (Paulhus, 2002).  
The question of “frame of reference” frequently comes into play as part of this 
aspect of response distortion as well, suggesting that applicants may respond to 
personality measure items using a different context than non-applicants (Schmit, Ryan, 
Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995).  The applicant and non-applicant may have a different 
conditional disposition, which is the tendency to express behaviors that are contingent 
upon the situational conditions (Schmit et al, 1995, p.608).  Because the job candidates 
may be taking the personality measure with the job for which they are under 
consideration in mind, they may be considering what they would do in that job in 
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choosing their responses.  This frame-of-mind places greater emphasis on how a test-
taker would react in the future given their vision of a role rather than how they would 
answer based on their prior experiences or their present state-of-mind. Their answers 
might differ from incumbents who may be responding to items with regard to the jobs 
they already have, referencing their experience in those jobs and the expectations those 
jobs entail (Smith, Hanges, & Dickson, 2001). 
There have been several complex models the processes behind faking behavior or 
response distortion proposed over the years.  Snell et al. (1999) presented an interactional 
model which integrated both contextual factors and constructs in individual differences 
that were commonly associated with faking or response distortion behavior.  Those 
individual differences were placed into one of two categories: the ability to fake or 
distort, and the willingness to do so.  Factors like general mental ability, the ease of 
faking on the particular measure (including item type and format), and knowledge of 
what is being measured by the test were characteristics included in the category of 
“Ability to fake” (Snell et al., 1999).  “Willingness to fake” was determined by 
demographic factors, and additionally contextual factors (e.g. the presence or absence of 
warnings, the importance of test outcome, etc.) and dispositional factors such as integrity, 
and the tendency to be manipulative (Snell et al., 1999).  Critics of this model point to the 
lack of exploration into personality factors that may also be associated with the 
“willingness” factor (Muller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006). 
A second model was proposed by McFarland and Ryan (2000, 2001), which was 
based largely upon Azjen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior.  This model asserts that 
faking behavior is a result of intention to fake, and that intention to fake is born out of a 
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mixture of attitudes toward faking, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.  
According to this model, attitudes toward faking were influenced by the perceived 
rightness and wrongness of faking, subjective norms were influenced by beliefs about 
how others felt about faking, and perceived behavioral control was determined by beliefs 
about the ease or difficulty of faking (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).  Though the model was 
supported by data (McFarland & Ryan, 2001), the model lacks Snell et al.’s (1999) 
dispositional factors that can include factors like the ever-important applicant status, and 
other elements central to the “faking” arguments. 
Additional research into the processes involved with faking and response 
distortion focuses on individual differences (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 
2006), and provides one of the newest models of faking behavior.  This model integrates 
those proposed by Snell et al. (1999) and McFarland & Ryan (2000, 2001), and 
additionally incorporates specific personality factors into the model.  As shown in Figure 
1, the hypothetical model theorized that faking behavior was again preceded by intention 
to fake, and that intention to fake was preceded by a number of antecedents: perceptions 
of the situation, ability to fake, willingness to fake, and “Big Five” personality factors 
Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006).   
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Figure 1 From Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006 p. 4 
While the results supported the inclusion of Conscientiousness, Emotional 
Stability, and perceptions of the situation in the model, oddly, the data showed that ability 
to fake did not have a strong correlation with intention to fake, and willingness to fake 
showed a significant negative relationship with intention to fake.  Overall, however, this 
model supported Paulhus’s (1984, 2002) notion of faking or response distortion as an 
impression management strategy that can vary from person to person, rather than the 
earlier notion of deliberate deception put forth by Sackeim and Gur (1978) among others. 
Additional explanations as to why people may fake their responses on self-report 
personality measures are still under examination. There are those that argue that this 
might be a difficult question to resolve, as researchers may be prone to using non-
empirical evidence to back up their claims, which risks becoming what Dilchert and 
colleagues (2006) would call “pseudo-scientific lore” (p. 213), meaning that 
psychologists may use pure postulation to arrive at a conclusion about these cognitive 
processes.   
 11 
Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996) provide the strongest support for self-report 
personality measures regarding their “fakability” and validity.  The authors are generally 
of the belief that faking doesn’t often occur in non-experimental settings, and dismiss the 
role of social desirability as a “red herring,” stating that it has no effect on the criterion-
related validity of personality measures, and is not nearly as big of a problem in industrial 
and organizational psychology as past literature examining the topic has led us to believe.  
They also contend that social desirability scale scores reflect individual differences in 
personality constructs.  More specifically, high scores on social desirability scales are 
related to emotional stability and conscientiousness (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996).  
In their meta-analysis of response distortion and social desirability research, they argue 
that “removing the effect of social desirability form the Big Five dimensions of 
personality does not improve criterion-related validity of personality constructs (p.670).”  
Barrick and Mount (1996) examined both factors in Paulhus’s (1984) model of 
socially desirable responding, looking at response distortion related to both self-deception 
and impression management, and their potential effects on the predictive validity of the 
personality constructs.  Unlike the aforementioned study, Barrick & Mount noted that 
applicants did, in fact, engage in response distortion in the form of both self-deception 
and impression management.  However, their research supported the claim that the 
distortion did not have an effect on the predictive validity of the personality constructs.  
Additional research done by others provides further support for these claims 
(Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Hough, 1998; Ones et al., 2007). 
Holden (2008) found significant effects for response distortion on test validity 
using two different personality measures on two different samples, and suggests that 
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other studies may be underestimating the extent to which induced-faking research can be 
generalized to non-experimental samples.  More specifically, the author notes that the use 
of moderated regression in tandem with the use of socially desirable responding scales 
causes the faking effect sizes to be more severely underestimated than many would 
believe (Holden, 2008, p. 320).  Holden also notes that social desirability scales may be 
better measures of personality constructs or traits, as they are “fallible indicators of 
faking (p.320).” 
Do Social Desirability/Impression Management Scales Detect Response Distortion? 
In the extensive research done on socially desirable responding (SDR), one of the 
most common and logical methods of describing types of socially desirable responding is 
a two-factor method (Wiggins, 1964, Damarin & Messick, 1965; Sackeim & Gur, 1978; 
Paulhus, 2002).  The two factors were perhaps most concisely described by Sackeim and 
Gur (1978) as “self-deception” and “other deception,” and later by Paulhus (1984) as 
“self-deception” and “impression management.”  Self-deception refers to non-deliberate 
response distortion, where the test-taker may believe they are something they are not, 
while “impression management” allows for both deliberate lying and the “habitual 
presentation of a specific positive public impression (Paulhus, 2002, p. 56)” which may 
not be regarded as actual “deception.”  
The first Social Desirability scale was created by Edwards (1957b), and was a 79-
item scale that had showed perfect agreement in an initial sample that asked participants 
to respond in a socially desirable fashion.  The chance probability of such agreement was 
less than .001 on each item.  Often called impression management scales or social 
desirability scales, they tend to include items that the majority of people aiming to appear 
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positively would likely answer in one direction.  In their most generic form, these scales 
measure the responses to statements like, “I have never lied,” and would consider those 
who answer “Correct” or “Agree” to such a statement as people who are likely answering 
in a socially desirable fashion, rather than honestly.  While it would seem more 
impressive to an employer to suggest that you have never lied, and that you are a very 
honest and moral person, in actuality it is extraordinarily unlikely that the person taking 
the test has never told even so much as a white lie so long as he or she can remember.  
The individual that is interpreting a test with an abnormally high social desirability score 
would be advised to place less trust in the rest of the test-taker’s results, sometimes going 
so far as to suggest that the participant be administered another version of the test to see 
if the scores align appropriately (SHL Group, 1999).  
That said, some research suggests that the interpretation of lie scales should be 
modified, as aiming to appear socially desirable may not be a negative attribute in a real-
world selection situation (Elliott, 1981).  As Edwards (1957b) stated during a time that 
saw the creation of many of the social desirability scales found in today’s measures, “It is 
obvious… that what is considered desirable and undesirable in the way of personality 
traits is culturally determined (p. 8).”  It follows that if an item is viewed as highly 
desirable in a particular culture, its endorsement would also be viewed as positive by that 
culture.  Possessing socially desirable attributes could certainly be a good thing in a 
selection situation, so it is important to draw the line between actually possessing socially 




Does Response Distortion Affect the Validity of Personality Measures? 
 As mentioned earlier, the concern about the effect of response distortion on the 
validity of personality measures is a heavily-researched area, but will be discussed only 
briefly in this review.  There are those that contend that any response distortion that 
occurs has no effect on the validity of the measure (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Hogan, 
Barrett, & Hogan, 2007; Hough et al., 1990; Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 
2007; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), and then there are others who question that 
claim, suggesting that faking and response distortion have serious implications for the 
validity of personality measures, and that previous research could be underestimating the 
actual effect (Holden, 2008; Morgeson et al., 2007; Rossé, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 
1998).  
Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996) provide the strongest support for self-report 
personality measures regarding their “fakability” and validity.  The authors are generally 
of the belief that faking doesn’t often occur in non-experimental settings, and dismiss the 
role of social desirability as a “red herring,” stating that it has no effect on the criterion-
related validity of personality measures, and is not nearly as big of a problem in industrial 
and organizational psychology as past literature examining the topic has led us to believe.  
They also contend that social desirability scale scores reflect individual differences in 
personality constructs.  More specifically, high scores on social desirability scales are 
related to emotional stability and conscientiousness (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996).  
In their meta-analysis of response distortion and social desirability research, they argue 
that “removing the effect of social desirability form the Big Five dimensions of 
personality does not improve criterion-related validity of personality constructs (p.670).”  
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Barrick and Mount (1996) examined both factors in Paulhus’s (1984) model of 
socially desirable responding, looking at response distortion related to both self-deception 
and impression management, and their potential effects on the predictive validity of the 
personality constructs.  Unlike the aforementioned study, Barrick & Mount noted that 
applicants did, in fact, engage in response distortion in the form of both self-deception 
and impression management.  However, their research supported the claim that the 
distortion did not have an effect on the predictive validity of the personality constructs.  
Additional research done by others provides further support for these claims 
(Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Hough, 1998; Ones et al., 2007). 
Holden (2008) found significant effects for response distortion on test validity 
using two different personality measures on two different samples, and suggests that 
other studies may be underestimating the extent to which induced-faking research can be 
generalized to non-experimental samples.  More specifically, the author notes that the use 
of moderated regression in tandem with the use of socially desirable responding scales 
causes the faking effect sizes to be more severely underestimated than many would 
believe (Holden, 2008, p. 320).  Holden also notes that social desirability scales may be 





PRESENT RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
 Present Research Question 
While many studies have set out to measure whether or not response distortion 
has an effect on the validity of self-report scales (Holden, 2008; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, 
Kamp, & McCloy, 1990), far fewer have looked at the effectiveness of so-called “lie 
scales” (Elliott, 1981) and of social desirability or impression management scales. This 
study will look for differences in job candidate and incumbent scores on a personality 
measure that are consistent with patterns of socially desirable responding (SDR), and 
determine whether the response distortion scale (e.g. social desirability scales) in the 
personality measure is effectively reflecting that SDR may be taking place. 
Although extensive research has been done looking at the scores of applicants 
versus non-applicants on personality measures (Rossé et al., 1998), and examined 
induced faking in undergraduate student subject studies (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & 
Thornton, 2006), few studies have broken down the job function of subjects into 
relatively specific areas (Birkeland et al, 2006).  It appears even fewer studies have 
looked specifically at the industry of the companies at which the subjects are employed or 
applying to be employed (Elliott, 1981), with those that do comparing few and seemingly 
random industries.   
The present study will examine each of these constructs in relation to response 
distortion on the 5
th
 edition of the Sixteen Personality Factor personality measure (16PF; 
Cattell & Cattell, 1995), which is a widely-used measure than can be employed in a 
selection context.  Data will be procured from a large sample of high-level executives in 
 17 
various roles across a variety of industries throughout the United States and Europe who 
have completed the 16PF as part of an executive assessment a) related to a succession 
management or talent review project, or b) as part of a selection procedure.   
Prior research on the “fakability” of the 16PF has been conducted as part of the 
validation of various editions of the measure (Braun & Lafaro, 1968), and corrections for 
faking on the 16PF have been proposed (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 
1994).  However, the overall effectiveness of the Impression Management scale as a 
method for detecting response distortion, especially the comparison of candidate and 
incumbent samples, has not yet been examined in any great detail. 
Primary Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Past studies have repeatedly shown a significant difference between applicant and 
non-applicant scores on personality measures, supporting the idea that applicants may be 
more apt to skew their answers in a socially desirable direction (Birkeland, Manson, 
Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, & Kamp, 1990; Morgeson 
et al, 2007a, Rosse et al., 1998).  This difference may be a result of the fact that 
applicants have more riding on the outcome of the personality measure than incumbents, 
and have more reason to make a good impression (Robie, Zickar, & Schmit, 2001; Rossé 
et al., 1998).  Given these findings, this study hypothesizes a statistically significant 
difference between candidate and incumbent groups on the 16PF.  Because prior research 
has not examined scale-by-scale differences on the 16PF specifically, it is unclear which 
of the specific scales will show differences, and exactly how many of the 16 scales will 
differ.  However, if response distortion related to social desirability is driving the 
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difference between the groups, with the job candidates skewing their answers in a more 
socially desirable direction, it is expected that the individual 16PF scales that have strong 
correlations with the social desirability scale on the 16PF, Impression Management scale, 
will be more likely to show univariate scale differences. Specific scale differences can be 
examined using a post-hoc procedure if an overall difference is found. 
Hypothesis 2 
Social desirability scales exist in part to indicate whether a test-taker may be 
“attempting to consciously or unconsciously oversell themselves” (SHL Group, 1999, p. 
68).  If the results expected in H1 are found, the presence of significant mean differences 
on multiple scales of a personality measure could suggest that response distortion is 
taking place in one of the groups.  If the differences in the scales are suggestive of 
socially desirable responding (SDR), that difference between the groups should also be 
reflected in the scale that is specifically designed to measure social desirability or 
impression management, which in the case of the 16PF is the Impression Management 
scale. On the contrary, this study hypothesizes that the 16PF scale designed to measure 
SDR and response distortion will not show a significant difference between the candidate 
and incumbent groups.  This outcome would suggest that the social 
desirability/impression management scale may not be measuring faking and response 








Though research has been done looking broadly at job function in relation to 
response distortion (Birkeland et al, 2006), a more detailed breakdown of job roles would 
be useful to help determine whether there is a difference in response distortion levels in 
different job functions.  Some have suggested that jobs in fields like Sales & Marketing 
that require “positive” personality characteristics for success will be subjected to higher 
levels of response distortion than fields like Finance, where success is more heavily 
reliant on a particular skill than on personality (Birkeland et al, 2006; Morgeson et al, 
2007a).  This study hypothesizes that there will be a significant difference in 16PF scores 
based on the job function of the applicants.  Due to the relative lack of research 
highlighting individual scale differences, which scales will differ and exactly how many 
will differ is unclear.   
Hypothesis 4 
In a 2007 Personnel Psychology article discussing the issues with self-report 
personality measures, Hollenbeck raised the example of working at Disney (Morgeson et 
al 2007): “If you work at Disney, you are supposed to have a good day every single 
day…if you cannot fake a personality item, how are you going to work at Disney 
everyday, smiling at these young children stomping on your feet?” (p. 717).  Though 
Hollenbeck uses the example in reference to job function, the example may also apply to 
the industry of the company.  For example, do those employed at a large, multi-national 
industrial manufacturing companies show different levels of “warmth” than those 
employed in the leisure and hospitality industry independent of job function?  The 
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differences may be a result of self-selection, or may be induced by the nature of the 
industries themselves, but the present study hypothesizes that there will be statistically 
significant differences in scale scores between industries.  Once again, the specific scale 





The 16PF personality scale was administered to approximately 1,750 executives 
between 2002 and 2009 as part of an executive assessment process conducted by a 
private global consulting firm.  The sample is composed of those in upper management 
positions in corporations of varying sizes throughout the world.  The corporations range 
from large, complex Fortune 50 companies with a global presence and household-name 
status to private equity-backed startup companies with few employees.  The executives 
come from companies covering a broad spectrum of industries, from investment banks to 
steel companies to technology providers.  Age and ethnicity-related data is not available 
for the executive group due to data privacy and anti-discrimination laws.  
The subjects were required to take the 16PF for one of three reasons: 1) As part of 
a “Succession Management/Talent Review,” indicating a non-applicant status, 2) To aid 
in determining whether a current employee is appropriate for another role within the 
company (e.g. a promotion, or a move to another branch or division of the company), 
indicating an internal applicant status, or 3) To aid in the selection of an external 
candidate, again indicating an applicant status.  For the purposes of this research, the 
external and internal candidate data will be considered in one group, as they both have a 
candidate status, and therefore also have a candidate mindset when completing the 
assessments. 
Succession Management/Talent Review  The assessment was given to some 
executives (N=1,223) as part of a talent review or succession management process, 
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during which a company wanted to get a better idea of the talent they already had in their 
ranks, as well as gain a greater understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their 
executives in one or many areas of the business.  These reviews are often used as part of 
a management change or for succession planning purposes.  Those completing the 16PF 
as part of a Succession Management or Talent Review assessment were not under 
consideration for any specific role within the company, and were not part of any 
particular hiring or promotion process when they were assessed.  Their results will only 
be used for the succession management/talent review project for which it was 
administered. 
Job Candidate  Job candidates (N= 449) were assessed as part of the selection 
process for a particular role either within the company at which the candidate currently 
works (internal candidates), or within companies by which the candidate had not 
previously been employed (external candidates).  For internal candidates, the role may 
represent a traditional promotion, or may be a role within another business unit or region 
of a large organization.  External candidates are traditionally new introductions to both 
the organization and the specific role.  
The internal or external executive may be the only person in consideration for the 
role, or one of many from inside and/or outside the organization. All executives assessed 
are aware that they are being assessed in the context of their potential success in the 
specific role for which they are being considered, and that their candidacy for the role 
may be affected by their results.   
Function   Job function was recorded by the consulting firm.  For the sake of 
parsimony, only the four most clearly defined functions were used.  Those with a 
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“Finance” label may include CFOs, Treasurers, Controllers, Audit professionals, 
Financial Reporting executives, Investor Relations professionals, and others employed in 
a financial capacity.  Those in the Marketing and Sales function include those with titles 
like Vice President of Marketing, Account Manager, Vice President of Sales, Sales 
Manager, etc.  Operations executives may include those with titles like COO, Vice 
President of Operations, Plant Manager, etc.  General Management executives typically 
serve in roles where a large part of the job description involves managing others or 
managing varied parts of the business.  They may hold titles like Managing Director, 
CEO, or Division GM. 
Industry  The industry of the client company was determined by the consulting 
firm, typically using the primary SIC code to make determinations about primary 
industry. 
Measure 
The 16PF (Cattell, 1970) is a widely-used personality measure that consulting 
firms often use as part of an assessment battery.  Initially published in 1949, the test is 
based on 16 facets of personality. 
The 5
th
 edition of the 16PF (Cattell, Cattell, & Cattell, 1993) consists of 16 scales 
determined using 10-15 items representing different areas of personality: Warmth (11 
items), Emotional Stability (10 items), Dominance (10 items), Liveliness (10 items), 
Rule-Consciousness (11 items), Social Boldness (10 items), Sensitivity (11 items), 
Vigilance (10 items), Abstractedness (11 items), Privateness (10 items), Apprehension 
(10 items), Openness to Change (14 items), Self-Reliance (10 items), Perfectionism (10 
items), Tension (10 items), and Reasoning (15 items).  All scales are noncognitive with 
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the exception of  Reasoning, which looks to measure basic cognitive ability.  
Additionally, there is an “Impression Management” scale (IM, 12 items) designed to 
measure faking or response distortion levels, and specifically those within the 
“Impression Management” realm of Paulhus’s (1984) two-factor theory of Socially 
Desirably Responding. 
Conn (1994) reports the mean test-retest reliability on the 16PF as .80, with a 
range of .69 (Reasoning) to .86 (Self-Reliance).  The range of internal consistency is 
reported from .64 (Openness to Change) to .85 (Social Boldness) with a mean value of 





Candidate scores on each of the 16 scales were compared to the scores of the 
incumbent group using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA).  1,672 
executives completed the 16PF and had a record of their candidate or incumbent status.  
The MANOVA yielded results significant at the p<.001 level for all three tests reported 
(Pillai’s trace, Hotelling’s T, Wilk’s lambda), suggesting significant scale score 
differences exist between the candidate and incumbent groups on the 16 scales of the 
16PF. Box’s M was significant, which is a concern because of the large discrepancy in 
group sizes.  However, because the determinant is larger for the larger group, we can 
ascertain that the tests were too conservative (Stevens, 2002).  Because each of the tests 
was still significant despite the fact that each test was more conservative, the significance 
of Box’s test is not problematic for this analysis.   
In a post-hoc examination of each of the 16 16PF scales, 8 scales were determined 
to be statistically significant after Bonferroni corrections were applied to the univariate 
results.  Univariate results for the scales are listed in Table 1, and means and standard 
deviations are found in Table 2.  Reasoning (B), Emotional Stability (C), Social Boldness 
(H), Vigilance (L), Privateness (N), Openness to Change (Q1), Self-Reliance (Q2), and 
Tension (Q4) showed statistically significant differences between candidate and 
incumbent groups at an  = .003125 level (corrected using Bonferroni.  Can also be 




Univariate F-tests with (1,1672) D. F. 
Bonferroni critical F = 8.755 






















Variable Hypoth. SS Error SS Error MS     F 
Warmth (A) 19.92777 4564.56686 2.73000 7.2995 
Reasoning (B) 25.39449 3507.79846 2.09797 12.1043* 
Emotional Stability (C)  38.61792 3179.48722 1.90161 20.3080* 
Dominance (E) 6.44155 4469.86490 2.67336 2.4095 
Liveliness (F) 21.21517 4449.56201 2.66122 7.9720 
Rule Consciousness (G) 8.68909 4488.75715 2.68466 3.2366 
Social Boldness (H) 106.88483 4813.32604 2.87878 37.1285* 
Sensitivity (I) 6.54197 4127.10976 2.46837 2.6503 
Vigilance (L) 54.29297 4315.36295 2.58096 21.0360* 
Abstractedness (M) 1.03110 3393.62601 2.02968 .5080 
Privateness (N) 65.99378 5342.65616 3.19537 20.6530* 
Apprehension (O) 16.95970 3526.88977 2.10938 8.0401 
Openness to Change (Q1) 72.86157 4810.21907 2.87693 25.3262* 
Self-Reliance (Q2) 87.33818 5204.87269 3.11296 28.0563* 
Perfectionism (Q3) 4.06772 5129.70588 3.06801 1.3259 
Tension (Q4) 97.23119 3423.65351 2.04764 47.4845* 
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Table 2  
Scale Means and Standard Deviations 
*indicates scale was statistically significant in post-hoc univariate analysis 
Scale  Candidate M  Cand 
Std. Dev.  
Incumbent M  Incumb. 
Std. Dev.  
Total Std. 
Dev.  
A Warmth  5.90  1.469  5.66  1.712  1.654  
B Reasoning*  7.43  1.328  7.15  1.489  1.452  
C Emotional Stability*  7.13  1.200  6.79  1.439  1.387  
E Dominance  6.95  1.490  6.81  1.683  1.634  
F Liveliness  5.41  1.521  5.15  1.671  1.636  
G Rule Consciousness  5.74  1.546  5.91  1.670  1.639  
H Social Boldness*  6.90  1.626  6.33  1.723  1.716  
I Sensitivity  4.48 1.428  4.34  1.620  1.572  
L Vigilance*  3.69  1.563  4.09  1.621  1.615  
M Abstractedness  4.63  1.415  4.68  1.429  1.425  
N Privateness*  4.80  1.812  5.24  1.779  1.799  
O Apprehension  4.31  1.393  4.54  1.473  1.455  
Q1 Openness to 
Change*  
7.30  1.544  6.82  1.544  1.749  
Q2 Self-Reliance*  4.14  1.666  4.65  1.666  1.798  
Q3 Perfectionism  5.66  1.665  5.55  1.782  1.751  
Q4 Tension*  4.55  1.418  5.10  1.435  1.451  
 
Correlations on the canonical variable created by the analysis were also 
interpreted.  Emotional Stability (C), Social Boldness (H), and Openness to Change (Q1) 
all show a strong negative relationship with the canonical variable.  Reasoning (B) shows 
a moderate negative relationship with the canonical variable.  Vigilance (L), Privateness 
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(N), Self-Reliance (Q2), and Tension (Q4) all show strong positive relationships with the 
canonical variable.  The same variables that were significant in the post-hoc univariate 
analysis represented the largest loadings on the canonical variable.  Those scales on 
which the job candidates had a significantly higher mean score than incumbents had 
negative relationships with the canonical variable, and those scales on which incumbents 
scored significantly higher than candidates had positive relationships with the canonical 
variable.  No other variables showed a notable relationship with the canonical variable. 
In trying to understand patterns in the differences in results between the two 
groups, it is also important to examine the individual scales which showed the largest 
score differences, and determine what each of those scales is designed to measure.  Factor 
B is a reasoning scale on the 16PF.  In the results actor B showed the weakest 
relationship with the canonical variable, and had the lowest F-value of those scales that 
were significant.  Job candidates obtained a higher score of the Reasoning scale than 
incumbents.  Though the overwhelming majority of the candidates were employed 
elsewhere at the time they were being considered as candidates, they still did have more 
at stake in taking the 16PF.  This may have led them to put more effort into completing 
the reasoning scale than incumbents.  Because this was an ability scale and not a 
personality scale, it is likely the only scale upon which focus and effort can make a 
difference in results, as it is unlikely that in a relatively homogeneous sample, the job 
candidates would have significantly better reasoning ability than incumbents. 
 Candidates also received higher scores on Emotional Stability (C), which 
measures feelings about coping with everyday life, and has a strong correlation with the 
Impression Management scale (Russell & Karol, 2002).  A low score on Emotional 
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Stability (C-) contributes to the anxiety global factor on the 16PF.  The Social Boldness 
(H) scale, upon which the candidates also received a higher mean score, measures social 
boldness versus shyness, and contributes to the extraversion and independence global 
factors on the 16PF.  This scale shows a strong relationship with self-esteem inventories.  
The final scale on which candidates obtained a significantly higher mean score than 
incumbents was the Openness to Change factor (Q1), which measures the extent to which 
an examinee is either open to innovation or experimentation or prefers the status quo.  
Openness to change contributes to the independence global factor and the receptiveness 
pole of the tough-mindedness global factor (Russell & Karol, 2002).  Each of these 
factors also had a negative relationship with the canonical variable. 
 The incumbents recorded higher scores than the job candidates on four scales, 
each of which had a positive relationship with the canonical variable.  Vigilance (L) is 
designed to measure the willingness to trust others rather than be vigilant about their 
motives or intentions (Russell & Karol, 2002).  Vigilance contributes to both the anxiety 
and independence global factors.  Privateness (N) measures the extent to which an 
examinee is forthright or private with others.  Privateness loads negatively on the 
extraversion global factor on the 16PF, and is correlated with the Impression 
Management scale, with lower scales being more socially desirable (Russell & Karol, 
2002).  The level of desire to spend time alone versus being group-oriented is measured 
on the Self-Reliant scale (Q2).  Self-Reliance has a negative correlation with the 
Impression Management scale, and loads on the extraversion global factor of the 16PF.  
Tension (Q4) has the largest correlation with the Impression Management scale (r= -.53; 
Conn & Rieke, 1994).  According to the administration manual authors, “Social 
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desirability can affect Factor Q4 results.  Since the items are fairly transparent, they can 
be influenced by response sets to present oneself favorably (Q4-)… (Russell & Karol, 
2002, p.56)”. Low scores indicate that an examinee is relaxed and patient, whereas high 
scorers may be restless and irritable.  Tension also showed the largest F-statistic in the 
MANOVA analysis of the groups. 
At least one of the scales significant at the univariate level loaded on all of the 
global factors of the 16PF (Extraversion, Tough-Mindedness, Independence, Anxiety) 
save the Self-Control global factor. 
Hypothesis 2 
A t-test examined group differences on the Impression Management scale of the 
16PF.  The t-test yielded a t-value of 1.789, which was not significant at the p<.05 level 
(N=1,672). Equal variances were assumed as Levene’s test was not significant.  Overall, 
the job candidate group had a higher mean score than the incumbent group, but the 
difference was not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 3 
In the secondary analyses, the 16PF scores were broken down into four job 
functions that were categorized and recorded by the consulting firm. The functions of 
1,057 executives were examined using a MANOVA.  All three tests performed in the 
MANOVA (Pillais Trace, Hotelling’s T, Wilks Lambda) were statistically significant at 
the p<.001 level, supporting the hypothesis that differences between functional groups 
would exist. Box’s M was significant, and the fact that the largest group (General 
Management) had the largest determinant, and the smallest group (Marketing & Sales) 
had the smallest determinant indicates that the MANOVA tests were too conservative 
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(Stevens, 2002).  In an examination of the univariate analysis, Warmth (A), Social 
Boldness (H), and Openness to Change (Q1) were found to have significant differences 
between the functional groups after Bonferroni corrections were applied. 
Hypothesis 4 
The industry of the company at which the subject is a candidate or an incumbent 
was also examined. The data were categorized into the following types of companies: 
Industrial, Natural Resources, Consumer-Related, Technology, Financial Services, 
Healthcare, and Professional, Business, & Management Services. Differences between 
industry groups on the 16PF were examined using a MANOVA procedure.  Because of 
the overpowering size of one group (the Industrial Companies group, n=623), these 
differences were examined using two different models: one which included all 7 industry 
groups, and one which excluded the exceptionally large group.   
Model 1  A MANOVA was completed using 16PF and industry data from 1,711 
executives in 7 groups.  Box’s M was significant at p<.01.  Because the largest 
determinant in the model was that of the largest group, we can conclude that the 
MANOVA is being overly conservative (Stevens, 2002).  Despite the conservative nature 
of the test, all three MANOVA tests (Pillai’s trace, Hotelling’s T, and Wilks lambda) 
were significant at the p<.001 level. 
Model 2  Once again, Box’s M was significant, this time at p<.05.  The largest 
determinant in the model was again that of the largest group, we can conclude that the 
MANOVA is being overly conservative. All three MANOVA tests were again significant 
at the p<.001 level.   
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The models differed in the individual scales that were found to show significant 
univariate differences when a Bonferroni correction was applied.  That discrepancy 
coupled with the issues raised by the discrepancies in group sizes and the size of the 
determinants of the various groups leads one to regard the results related to industry as 
questionable in their application.  The data entry of this variable (completed by the 
consulting firm) may have suffered from some data quality and consistency issues, and 




The job candidate and incumbent groups showed significant differences overall 
on the 16 scales of the 16PF personality measure.  The statistical values supporting the 
difference were strong, showing a p<.001 significance level on the three most common 
MANOVA measures in spite of being subjected to particularly conservative testing 
conditions.  Much of the research done on response distortion in personality measures 
contends that a difference between applicant and incumbent scores on a measure is an 
indication that response distortion may be occurring (Birkeland et al., 2001; Robie et al., 
2001; Rossé et al., 1998).  Whether those examinees are engaging in self-deception or 
impression management (or “other-deception”) as outlined by Paulhus (1984) is unclear, 
but given the prior inferences made from similar studies with similar results (e.g. 
Morgeson et al., 2007a; Rosse et al., 1998), one could argue that some kind of response 
distortion has occurred in this sample.   
This assertion is further supported by the fact that a number of the scales that 
showed significant differences in a post-hoc univariate analysis have high correlations 
with the Impression Management, which is designed to measure socially desirable 
responding (SDR) and response distortion.  Table 3 contains the correlations of each 
scale with the Impression Management scale in this study.  Table 4 contains the original 
correlation of each of the 16PF scales with the Impression Management scale from the 
16PF technical manual.  Each table indicates which of 16PF scales were significant in the 






16PF scale correlations with Impression Management (IM) scale 
 
16 PF Scale IM Correlation 
Warmth (A) .149* 
Reasoning (B) .032^ 
Emotional Stability (C) .363* ^ 
Dominance (E) -.014 
Liveliness (F) .032 
Rule-Consciousness (G) .217* 
Social Boldness (H) .208* ^ 
Sensitivity (I) -.054 
Vigilance (L) -.354* ^ 
Abstractedness (M) -.211* 
Privateness (N) -.181*^ 
Apprehension (O) -.329* 
Openness to Change (Q1) .102* ^ 
Self-Reliance (Q2) -.246* ^ 
Perfectionism (Q3) .156* 
Tension (Q4) -.436* ^ 
*significant at p<.01 (N=1,799) 
^significant univariate scale results in post hoc analysis 
 
Table 4 
16PF scale correlations with Impression Management (IM) scale 
from (Conn & Rieke, 1994, p.64) 
 
16 PF Scale IM Correlation 
Warmth (A) .16* 
Reasoning (B) -.01 ^ 
Emotional Stability (C) .50* ^ 
Dominance (E) -.02 
Liveliness (F) -.09* 
Rule-Consciousness (G) .34* 
Social Boldness (H) .20* ^ 
Sensitivity (I) -.03 
Vigilance (L) -.39* ^ 
Abstractedness (M) -.36* 
Privateness (N) -.12*^ 
Apprehension (O) -.39* 
Openness to Change (Q1) .06* ^ 
Self-Reliance (Q2) -.21* ^ 
Perfectionism (Q3) .17* 
Tension (Q4) -.53* ^ 
*significant at p<.01 
^significant univariate scale results in post hoc analysis 
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Seven of the eight scales that were significant after a Bonferroni correction was 
applied have significant correlations with the IM scale (p<.01) where the scale scores of 
this study were correlated with one another, and six of the eight scales show significant 
correlations with the IM scale (p<.01) according to the norms of the technical manual 
(Conn & Rieke, 1994).  The three scales with the strongest overall correlation with the 
Impression Management scale, both in this study and according to the norms (Tension, 
Emotional Stability, and Vigilance), were all significant in the univariate analysis, each 
producing F-statistic values greater than 20.  In fact, the scale that yields the highest 
correlation with the Impression Management scale resulted in an F-statistic that was a full 
10 units higher than the next closest statistic (F= 47.48).These results would support the 
notion that this difference between groups could exist as a result of response distortion or 
SDR.  Given these scales differences, and the relationship of these scales with the 
Impression Management scale, reflected both in this study and given the norms that 
resulted from the original construction of the measure, we’d also expect to see a 
difference between the groups on the Impression Management scale. 
On the contrary, although there was a difference in scores between the job 
candidate and incumbent groups on the 16PF, there was no significant difference between 
the groups on the Impression Management scale.  According to the 16PF technical 
manual (Conn & Rieke, 1994), “To address the issue of socially desirable responding, the 
Impression Management (IM) scale was developed for the 16PF Fifth Edition…A high 
IM score indicates more socially desirable responding or exaggeration of socially 
desirable qualities… (p.60) ”  Furthermore, the 16PF administrator’s manual (Russell & 
Karol, 2002) states that,  
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“IM is essentially a social-desirability scale… Thus high scores can reflect 
impression management (presenting oneself to others as tending to behave in 
desirable ways) or they can reflect an examinee’s self-image as a person who 
behaves in desirable ways.  In both cases, the possibility exists that the 
socially desirable responses might be more positive than the examinee’s 
actual behavior (i.e. a form of response distortion that may be conscious or 
unconscious)…(p.22)” 
With that in mind, one would think that in a large sample, the groups would show a 
significant difference on the Impression Management scale if they showed a difference 
on the 16PF scales, and more importantly a difference on half of the 16PF scales on a 
univariate level, and even further on specific scales with a strong correlation with the 
Impression Management scale.  Yet no significant difference is seen.  Given that the 
stated purpose of the Impression Management scale is “to address the issue of socially 
desirable responding (Conn & Rieke, 1994, p.60),” and its description contains verbiage 
about its use as measurement tool for a “form of response distortion (Russell & Karol, 
2002; p. 22),” if the differences between groups are in fact due to response distortion or 
social desirable responding, the fact that the scale may not be capturing that very 
phenomenon across a large sample is disconcerting,. 
That said, these results cannot speak directly to the validity of the IM scale of the 
16PF.  However, it can be said that if the IM scale of the 16PF was not valid, we would 
see no significant difference between the two groups on the scale when these types of 
differences exist on the other 16 scales of the 16PF.   Even having the ability to support 
that statement should lead those creating these personality measures to reexamine social 
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desirability scales, and determine whether or not they are successful in measuring what 
they are designed to measure. 
 
The fact that an analysis of scale differences on the 16PF among 4 different 
functions was significant as well was also of interest.  Though Hypothesis 3 did predict a 
difference between functional groups, the difference that appeared does not present a 
convincing case of response bias.  Of the three univariate scales that were determined to 
be significant, only one (Social Boldness) has a correlation with the Impression 
Management scale of .20 or greater in either this study or according to the norms(r=.208; 
r= .20; Conn & Rieke, 1994).  Given that different personalities may be drawn to 
different professions (Miller, 1962), it is not surprising that some differences existed, and 
that the Impression Management scale itself was not significant in this case (with an 
extremely low F of 0.357), as real personality differences have been found to exist 
between occupational groups (Daniels & Hunter, 1949).  But when all occupational areas 
are taken together, their differences should complement one another, creating a relatively 
normal distribution.  However, in the analysis of the candidate and incumbent groups, we 
see many more scales that are significant, that different scales are significant (Warmth 
carried a significant difference in the analysis of job function, but showed no significant 
difference between the candidate and incumbent groups), and that majority of those 
significant scales have a strong correlation with the IM scale. 
The effectiveness of Impression Management and Socially Desirability scales in 
detecting response distortion and socially desirable responding (SDR) has been discussed 
at great length since the creation of the scales (Edwards, 1957; Holden, 2008).  There are 
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those that say that the scales do exactly what they are designed to do (Cattell & Cattell, 
1995), but the results of the present study would not support that notion if the differences 
between groups are, in fact, a result of response distortion or SDR.   
On the other hand, some have argued that these scales may measure constructs 
other than response distortion.  Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss (1996) conducted a meta-
analysis of social desirability literature, and ultimately came to the conclusion that 
socially desirability scales were not a measure of SDR insofar as it relates to response 
distortion.  Instead, they claim that “social desirability scales reflect individual 
differences in personality variables (p.669).  In that sense, their definition of social 
desirability differs from much of the literature in that it contends that social desirability is 
not a measure of response bias or distortion.  
That definition-changing assertion leads me to a few relevant questions: What is 
the point of including a scale in a personality measure that designed to do one thing, but 
may actually do something else?  If, in fact, the scale is a better measure of another 
construct, why defend its continued use in its intended and stated capacity?  And would 
the debate exist if instead of involving Impression Management scales, it turned out that 
an Emotional Stability scale was better at measuring Vigilance than Emotional Stability?  
Much of the debate about these social desirability scales seems to be influenced by the 
overarching debate about the effectiveness of self-report personality measurements, and 
whether or not their validity is affected by response distortion. 
If those creating personality measures take the definition of a social desirability 
scale down the same route as Ones et al. (1996), and wish to create a scale that measures 
the extent to which an examinee attempts to make a good impression or please others, 
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that would change the intended purpose of social desirability scales.  However, this 
change would make the social desirability scale a facet of the personality portion of the 
measure, rather than a tool used to determine whether or not applicants are distorting 
their responses.  If that change is made, the stated purposes of these new scales would not 
be able to claim that scale scores can be used as a method by which to measure response 
distortion. 
Elliott (1981) proposed changing the way in which the scales are interpreted. 
Instead of using the scales as a measure of response bias or response distortion, Elliott 
suggested they should serve as a measure of conscientiousness, and can assist in 
determining whether or not the test-taker wants to make a good impression.  
Extraordinarily high scores may then still be brought to the attention of test 
administrators, alerting them to the fact that particular test-takers may be trying too hard 
to make the proper impression.  But, marketing the scale as a cut-and-dry measure of 
response distortion levels would be ignoring approximately 15 years of research that has 
shown that the scales may not measure response distortion and response distortion alone, 
and is instead measuring a number of constructs, one of which may be response distortion 
or “faking.”   
Some may regard this as an argument about semantics, but in the realm of 
personality research as it relates to Industrial and Organizational psychology, a correction 
or clarification of the semantics used would be a step in the right direction.  Though the 
literature seems to have exhausted the debate on SDR’s effect on personality measures, 
no substantial movement toward change has occurred as a result of that debate.  Because 
the debate seems to be reigniting in the wake of recent publications (e.g. Morgeson et al., 
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2007), steps should be taken to try to make self-report personality measures better.  
Acknowledging social desirability scales and impression management scales for what 
they really are would be one small step in the right direction, and perhaps encourage 
additional improvements.  If personality measures are improved to remove some of the 
gray area which has sparked so much debate over the last 50 years, we would ultimately 
have better measures.  One would hope these improved measures would lead to better 
results, which would leave less room for argument over the validity and meaning of the 
results obtained. 
Limitations 
 There is no way to determine with certainty that the differences in the groups are 
a direct reflection of response distortion or socially desirable responding.  Though prior 
research has often compared applicant and incumbent samples to show evidence of 
response distortion, the results are still not conclusive, as it is possible that other factors 
are influencing the results.   
 Firstly, it is possible that real differences exist between the candidate and 
incumbent groups in this sample.  The sample is not random, and although the vast 
majority of those in the candidate group are currently employed, it may be possible that 
true personality differences exist between those currently in roles, and those who are 
considering leaving their current role to pursue a new position.  The incumbents may also 
be showing frame-of-reference effects when compared to the candidates, as they are able 
to respond to items with the knowledge of what their current position entails, and how 
they have reacted to certain situations while within that role in the past, whereas 
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candidates are forced to use the knowledge they have to try to determine how they would 
act in a role they haven’t yet held. 
 Alternatively, it is possible that members of the incumbent group could have also 
viewed their assessment as a high-stakes situation, and in turn also engaged in socially 
desirable responding or response distortion.  This group could have potentially seen the 
assessment as something that could put their jobs at risk if their responses were not 
deemed to be acceptable, and in turn, these results could stem from the fact that both 
groups were engaging in response distortion, which would explain the fact that there was 
no difference between the group on the Impression Management scale, but would not 
necessarily explain the univariate differences on scales that are correlated with the 
Impression Management scale.  
Future Directions 
 A logical direction for an expansion of this study would examine the amount of 
variance in personality scale scores accounted for by function or industry as compared to 
the amount accounted for by candidate/incumbent status.  Attempting to determine which 
factor has a greater contribution to the variance in the personality scale scores could shed 
light on the strength of SDR, determining whether factors like function and industry carry 
more weight in the scale scores of personality measures than whether or not the examinee 
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